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Enjoining a Teachers' Strike: The Difficulties in
Defining the Clear and Present Danger Standard
INTRODUCTION
Pennsylvania's public school teachers gained the right to collec-
tively organize and bargain with their employers over eighteen
years ago. The teachers also obtained the ability to go out on strike
in support of their negotiating positions. If a strike commences, the
school districts in Pennsylvania have the choice of either signing a
new labor agreement or seeking a court injunction ordering the
teachers back to work.' This comment explores the statutory stan-
dard that a school district must satisfy before a Pennsylvania court
will issue an injunction, beginning with a review of the applicable
statutory provisions creating the school teachers' right to collec-
tively bargain and strike. Next, this comment traces the develop-
ment of case law in Pennsylvania interpreting and defining the
statutory language which authorizes the courts to enjoin a teach-
ers' strike. Finally, this paper comments on the current state of the
law, what impact it has on the various parties affected by a teach-
ers' strike, and how the courts may interpret the injunction stan-
dard in the future. Additionally, this work speculates on whether
the Pennsylvania legislature should consider revising the statute
which provides school teachers with the right to strike and the
courts with the power to limit those strikes.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
In 1970, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted, and the
Governor signed, Act 195,' which provided public school teachers
in Pennsylvania with the right to collectively organize and bargain
with their public employers.3 The state legislature clarified that its
public policy was to promote "orderly and constructive relation-
ships" between school boards and teachers, subject to the "para-
mount right" of Pennsylvania's citizens to maintain "their health,
1. See Act of July 23, 1970, Pub. L. 563, No. 195, as amended, 43 P.S. § 1101.1003
(Purdon Supp. 1988).
2. 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
3. Id. at § 1101.401.
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safety, and welfare."'4 In conjunction with the privilege to negoti-
ate a labor contract, school teachers also obtained the right to
strike.5 The only qualification on a union's right to strike was if the
labor dispute presented a "clear and present danger or threat to
the health, safety or welfare of the public."6 If a school board
could satisfy this standard, the district could obtain a court or-
dered injunction forcing the teachers back to work.7
The details of Act 195 require that both the public employer and
the employee union negotiate in good faith and bargain "with re-
spect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." Conversely, the school district possesses no obligation to
negotiate in areas that would be considered exclusively within the
domain of managerial policy." After negotiations for a new labor
agreement have commenced, both parties are required to request
aid from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation at the earlier of
twenty-one days after contract talks have commenced, or one hun-
dred and fifty days before the school district's budget submission
date. 10 If the influence of a mediator does not result in a settle-
ment within the next twenty days,"" the mediation bureau must
inform the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, which, in turn,
may appoint a fact-finding panel to further aid negotiations. 2
4. Id. at § 1101.101 (emphasis added). The General Assembly stated that its public
policy could best be achieved by:
(1) granting to public employes the right to organize and choose freely their repre-
sentatives; (2) requiring public employers to negotiate and bargain with employe or-
ganizations representing public employes and to enter into written agreements evi-
dencing the result of such bargaining; and (3) establishing procedures to provide for
the protection of the rights of the public employe, the public employer and the public
at large.
Id.
5. Id. at § 1101.1003. Pennsylvania public employees are not entitled to receive either
wages or other forms of compensation for any period that they are on strike. Id. at
1101.1006.
6. Id. at § 1101.1003.
7. Id. "In such cases the public employer shall initiate . . . an action for equitable
relief including but not limited to appropriate injunctions. Id.
8. Id. at § 1101.701.
9. Id. at § 1101.702. The policy areas inherently controlled by the public employer
"shall include but shall not be limited to such areas of discretion or policy as the functions
and programs of the public employer, standards of services, its overall budget, utilization of
technology, the organizational structure and selection and direction of personnel." Id.
10. Id. at § 1101.801. Once mediation has been initiated, it continues until the two
sides reach a settlement. Id. at § 1101.802.
11. Id. A settlement must be reached "in no event later than one hundred thirty days
prior to the 'budget submission date.' " Id.
12. Id. The Labor Board has discretion to appoint qualified members, who are broadly
representative of the public, to the fact-finding panel. Id. at § 1101.503. The panel possesses
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Both the public employer and public employees possess a statu-
tory duty to participate, in good faith, in the mediation and fact-
finding procedures."3 In addition, during the mediation and fact-
finding periods' the teachers are prohibited from going on strike. 5
The school board and union also have the option to submit all un-
resolved contract issues to binding arbitration.'" However, arbitra-
tion is not mandatory in Pennsylvania,17 and once the teachers
have completed the statutorily required bargaining processes, 8 the
union has the freedom to go out on strike.' Only two statutory
provisions may impinge upon the teachers' right to strike. The
school district may directly attack the strike by arguing that it rep-
resents a "clear and present danger" to the health and welfare of
the community.20 In attempting to obtain an injunction forcing a
union back to work, the school board's case may also be indirectly
aided by the statutory requirement that a public school system
provide its students with 180 days of instruction.2'
subpoena power and must hold hearings at which oral and written testimony would be
presented. Id. at § 1101.802. Within forty days after the mediator has informed the Board of
the continued impasse, the fact-finding panel must present its findings of fact and recom-
mendations to the Board, school district, and teachers union. Id. at § 1101.802(1). The
school board and 'union must inform each other and the Labor Board, within ten days,
whether or not the panel's recommendations are acceptable. Id. at § 1101.802(2). If either
party rejects the recommendations, they will be made public and the non-accepting side (or
sides) must reconsider and inform the Board, in the next five to ten days, whether to en-
dorse the panel's recommendations. Id. at § 1101.802(3).
13. Id. at § 1101.803.
14. For the maximum number of days involved in the mediation and fact-finding pro-
cess, see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
15. 43 P.S. § 1101.1002 (Purdon Supp. 1988). See Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v.
Bellefonte Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw. 210, 304 A.2d 922 (1973). There, the common-
wealth court held that the Labor Board's decision not to appoint a fact-finding panel did
not prohibit a teachers union from later going out on strike. Id. at 214, 304 A.2d at 925-26.
16. 43 P.S. § 1101.804 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
17. See Armstrong School Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 5 Pa. Commw. 387, 291
A.2d 125 (1972). There, the commonwealth court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to order the school district and teachers union to submit to binding arbitration because such
power was never conferred to the courts by the legislature under Act 195. Id. at 390, 291
A.2d at 128.
18. This bargaining process includes mediation under 43 P.S. § 1101.801 (Purdon
Supp. 1988) and fact-finding under 43 P.S. § 1101.802 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
19. 43 P.S. § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (Purdon 1962 and Supp. 1988). "All public
kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools shall be kept open each school year for at
least one hundred eighty (180) days of instruction for pupils." Id. The commonwealth court
has held that school districts have an absolute duty to schedule 180 days of instruction, and
a school board must attempt to honor that statutory responsibility,"notwithstanding post-
ponement or interruption of adopted schedules by strikes or other causes." Scanlon v.
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CASE LAW
Because Act 195 took effect in the summer of 1970, the courts of
Pennsylvania were first required to interpret the meaning of "clear
and present danger or threat to the health, safety, or welfare of
the public '22 when teachers unions went on strike during 1971 and
school districts sought injunctions to force their employees back to
work. The commonwealth court's initial attempt to interpret the
injunction language of Act 195 occurred in Armstrong Education
Association v. Armstrong School District.2 3 In that case, the issue
before the commonwealth court was whether a clear and present
danger to the public existed to warrant the lower court granting an
injunction24 ordering the union to return to the classroom. Twelve
days of classroom instruction had been lost, the district was in
jeopardy of losing state subsidies,25 extracurricular activities and
varsity sports had been cancelled, future "inservice days" were
threatened, transportation plans for the students were in jeopardy,
and school board directors had faced harassment.26
Mount Union Area Bd. of School Directors, 51 Pa. Commw. 83, 415 A.2d 96, 100 (1980),
afl'd, 499 Pa. 215, 452 A.2d 1016 (1982). See also Root v. Northern Cambria School Dist., 10
Pa. Commw. 174, 309 A.2d 175 (1973).
22. 43 P.S. § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
23. 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 291 A.2d 120 (1972). There, the teachers entered into collective
bargaining with the school district in December of 1970, but when an impasse was reached
the union went on strike effective April 27, 1971. Id. at 380, 291 A.2d at 122. An injunction
was issued on May 11, 1971 ordering the teachers back to work and the 1970-71 instruc-
tional year was completed without further incident. Id. However, negotiations throughout
the summer of 1971 were not fruitful, and on August 30, immediately before classes were to
commence, the Armstrong Education Association went back out on strike. Id. A requested
injunction by the school district was denied on September 1, but following a September 14
hearing, an injunction was granted ordering the teachers back to work on September 15,
1971. Id. at 380, 291 A.2d at 122-23. The union complied with the order, but filed an appeal
with the commonwealth court. Id. at 381, 291 A.2d at 123.
24. Id. The commonwealth court's standard of review in injunction cases is limited to
whether any reasonable grounds existed to justify the lower court's action, and the appellate
court will not further examine the merits "unless it is plain that no such grounds existed or
that the rules of law relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable." Id. (quoting Com-
munity Sports, Inc. v. Denver Ringsby Rockets, Inc., 429 Pa. 565, 569, 240 A.2d 832, 834
(1968)).
25. If the 180 day requirement under the School Code is not satisfied, the school dis-
trict may lose state subsidies which are distributed to the school system on a per day of
instruction basis. See 24 P.S. § 15-1501 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1988).
26. Armstrong, 5 Pa. Commw. at 380, 291 A.2d. at 122. In granting the September 14
injunction, the court of common pleas found a clear and present danger to the public ex-
isted "based on the strained atmosphere in the community as evidenced by the harassment
of School Board Directors as well as the Judge, and on the fact that 12 days of school, which
would have to be made up, had already been lost." Id. at 380, 291 A.2d at 122-23.
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The Armstrong opinion2" drew an analogy between the Act 195
"clear and present danger" standard and a similar use of the
phrase in cases addressing government interference with first
amendment rights.2 8 The court defined "clear" as including "that
which is not speculative but real, not imagined but actual," and
"present" as including "that which exists as contrasted with that
which does not yet exist and that which has ceased to exist."2 " In
interpreting "danger" or "threat," the commonwealth court deter-
mined that these terms must mean more than the normal inconve-
niences that are inevitable when public employees go on strike.30
The court reasoned that the harassment faced by the school di-
rectors was "clear and present," but was a common result of a
strike and therefore failed to constitute a "danger" as envisioned
by Act 195."' Along the same line, the Armstrong decision noted
that while considerable inconvenience was caused by the disrup-
tion of the school district's normal operating procedures and can-
cellation of student activities, these problems were also anticipated
side effects of a teachers strike and did not warrant the issuance of
an injunction.2 As for the potential for losing state subsidies, the
commonwealth court determined that less funding amounted to a
"danger," but with numerous make-up days still available before
the 180 day requirement was threatened, the danger was not yet
"clear and present."3 3 Therefore, the court concluded that the
Armstrong teachers union strike did not present a clear and pre-
sent danger to the public and an injunction ordering the teachers
back to work should not have been issued.
3 4
27. The commonwealth court decision was written by Judge Blatt. Id. at 378, 291 A.2d
at 121.
28. Id. at 381, 291 A.2d at 123 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) and
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).
29. Armstrong, 5 Pa. Commw. at 383, 291 A.2d at 123-24, (quoting Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531, 544 (D.C. Cir.
1954)).
30. Armstrong, 5 Pa. Commw. at 385, 291 A.2d at 124.
31. Id.
32. Id. "If we were to say that such inconveniences, which necessarily accompany any
strike by school teachers from its very inception, are proper grounds for enjoining such a
strike, we would in fact be nullifying the right to strike granted to school teachers by the
legislature in Act No. 195." Id.
33. Id. Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a school dis-
trict only provided 173 days of instruction because of a teachers strike, the state Depart-
ment of Education may withhold 7 days worth of state subsidies that would have been avail-
able if the school district had provided a full 180 days of classes. See School Dist. of
Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 492 Pa. 140, 422 A.2d 1054 (1980).
34. Armstrong, 5 Pa. Commw. at 386-87, 291 A.2d at 125. The court stated:
1989
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In dictum, the Armstrong court speculated that had the threat
of the school district losing state subsidies been a present danger,
the trial court would have possessed proper grounds for enjoining
the strike. 6 Specifically, the court stated that "[if] the strike
lasted so long, therefore, that any continuation would make it un-
likely that enough days would be available to make up the 180 re-
quired, the teachers could be properly enjoined from continuing
it." 6 The commonwealth court noted, however, that in the present
case only twelve school days were sacrificed to the strike and
thirty-nine make-up days were available, twenty days in June as
well as nineteen planned holidays, to satisfy the 180 day require-
ment.3 7 Thus, the court concluded that a strike must have
progressed to the point where its continuation would prohibit any
potential for satisfying the 180 day requirement and directly
threaten the district's receipt of state subsidies, and not until that
time, under the facts in Armstrong, would an injunction be
appropriate. 8
The commonwealth court was also asked to apply the clear and
present "threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public" stan-
dard of Act 195w' in Philadelphia Federation of Teachers v.
Ross."° In that case, the court considered whether an injunction
ordering the teachers back to work should be upheld when in-
creased gang activity had occurred, the city was expending an ad-
ditional $133,000 per day for extra police protection, and the debt-
ridden school district faced the potential loss of financial aid, al-
though this threat was not yet a present reality.4 1 The court found
We must hold that at the time this injunction was issued, there were no reasonable
grounds on which the lower court could find that the strike by the [teachers union]
was a 'clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the pub-
lic.' We must hold. . . that the proper purpose of an injunction under Act No. 195 is
to avert present danger, not to prevent danger which may never occur at all or which
can only occur, if it does occur, at some future time before which the grievances con-
cerned can reasonably be expected to be settled.
Id.
35. Id. at 385-86, 291 A.2d at 124-25.
36. Id. at 386, 291 A.2d at 125.
37. Id.
38. Id. See supra note 33.
39. 43 P.S. § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (as compared with the clear and present
"danger" standard).
40. 8 Pa. Commw. 204, 301 A.2d 405 (1973). The court's opinion was written by Presi-
dent Judge Bowman. Id. at 207-16, 301 A.2d at 406-411. A dissenting opinion was filed by
Judge Crumlish. Id. at 216-17, 301 A.2d at 411-12. A dissent was also submitted by Judge
Blatt, who was joined by Judge Mencer. Id. at 218-23, 301 A.2d at 412-14.
41. Id. at 213-14, 301 A.2d at 410. The teachers union had been on strike from Sep-
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that these circumstances threatened the welfare of the general
public, and the additional problems of instructional idleness for
underachievers, uncertainty about making up lost school days, and
the potential that high school seniors would be ineligible for col-
lege combined to threaten the student segment of the public.42
Therefore, the majority of the commonwealth court concluded that
a threat existed to the health, welfare or safety of the public and
the injunction was properly ordered.
43
Judge Blatt44 filed a dissenting opinion in the Ross case4" and
disputed the majority's finding that either a clear and present
danger or clear and present threat to the public welfare existed
when the trial court issued an injunction only hours after the
teachers' union had gone on strike.4'6 The dissent argued that
neither the extent of harm to underachieving students nor the bur-
den of additional security expenses had been clearly and specifi-
cally established by the school district.47 These problems, as well
as others discussed by the majority, would not be unusual in a
strike situation; however, Judge Blatt contended that at the time
the hearing took place, several hours after the teachers' walkout,
the evidence presented by the school district reflected an estimate
of the potential danger or threat to the public, not evidence of a
tember 5, 1972, until September 28, at which time the employees returned to work under a
Memorandum of Understanding. Id. at 208, 301 A.2d at 407. The Memorandum expired on
January 7, 1973, and the rank and file voted to go back on strike effective January 8; how-
ever, the school district obtained an injunction on January 11, prohibiting the strike and
ordering the teachers back to work. Id. Nevertheless, the union ignored the court order and
remained on strike, while at the same time appealing the issuance of the injunction to the
commonwealth court. Id. at 216 n.2, 301 A.2d at 411 n.2.
42. Id. at 214-15, 301 A.2d at 410-11.
43. Id. at 216, 301 A.2d at 411. "We do decide in the instant case that the facts reason-
ably found to exist by the lower court are sufficient to establish as a matter of law a threat
to the health, welfare or safety of the public." Id.
44. Judge Blatt wrote the opinion in Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School
Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 291 A.2d 120 (1972), where the commonwealth court dissolved an
injunction issued by the lower court because a 12 day strike did not present a clear and
present danger to the public. Id. at 386-87, 291 A.2d at 124-25. See also supra notes 23-38
and accompanying text.
45. Judge Blatt's dissenting opinion was joined by Judge Mencer. Ross, 8 Pa. Commw.
at 223, 301 A.2d. at 414.
46. Id. at 221-23, 301 A.2d at 413-14 (emphasis in original). The teachers strike com-
menced on Monday, January 8, 1973; the trial court also held its hearing on January 8, at
which time evidence was presented on whether the strike constituted a clear and present
danger or threat to the public; the injunction was issued on Thursday, January 11, 1973. Id.
at 220, 301 A.2d at 413.
47. Id. at 222-23, 301 A.2d at 414.
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clear and present danger or threat.48 In conclusion, the dissent
surmised that the Pennsylvania General Assembly, in passing Act
195, anticipated that the public would suffer some inconvenience
and expense, and only a unique threat to the public's welfare, un-
like the common type of difficulties expected to be faced by the
Philadelphia school district, would justify granting an injunction.
The commonwealth court, in Bellefonte Area Education Associ-
ation v. Board of Education of Bellefonte Area School District,°
examined the issue of whether a clear and present danger or threat
to the public existed when the school district might be unable to
continue its "quality assessment program '"5' and thirteen instruc-
tional days had been lost to the strike.5 " The court reasoned that
with fifteen summer vacation days and numerous scheduled holi-
days available to satisfy the state's 180 day requirement, the lower
court erred in ruling that the potential loss of state reimburse-
ments represented a clear and present danger or threat to the pub-
lic." The Bellefonte decision also determined that the school dis-
trict's lack of participation in the quality assessment program was
not so harmful as to justify denying the teachers their right to
strike under Act 195.51 Therefore, the court concluded that the
strike failed to endanger or threaten the public's welfare, and an
injunction of the teachers' strike was inappropriate. 55
48. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Blatt interpreted the words "clear and present" as
modifying not only a "danger," but also a "threat" to the public's welfare, health and safety.
Id.
49. Id. Judge Blatt took the position that if Philadelphia wanted a special exception
made for its school district because of the problems unique to an urban community, Phila-
delphia would have to obtain the exception from the state legislature, not the courts. Id.
50. 9 Pa. Commw. 210, 304 A.2d 922 (1973). The court's opinion was presented by
Judge Rogers. Id. at 212-29, 304 A.2d at 923-26. A concurring opinion was filed by Judge
Kramer, who was joined by Judge Crumlish. Id. at 219-20, 304 A.2d at 926. President Judge
Bowman concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 220-21, 304 A.2d at 927.
51. The quality assessment program is designed to measure the effectiveness of a
school district and compare it with other systems around the country. Id. at 215, 304 A.2d at
924.
52. Id. at 214, 304 A.2d at 923-24.
53. Id. at 214-15, 304 A.2d at 924 (citing Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School
Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 385-85, 291 A.2d 120, 124-25 (1972)).
54. Bellefonte, 9 Pa. Commw. at 215-16, 304 A.2d at 924.
[The quality assessment program], and other desirable things, including many extra-
curricular activities which are the delight of secondary school life, were bound to be
lost to districts undergoing strikes, which the legislature decided, when it passed the
Act, were required to be sanctioned in order 'to promote orderly and constructive
relationships between all public employers and their employes.'
Id. (quoting 43 P.S. § 1101.101 (Purdon Supp. 1988)).
55. Bellefonte, 9 Pa. Commw. at 214, 304 A.2d at 923.
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Judge Kramer filed a concurring opinion in Bellefonte which
outlined a concern for whether the school children were being
properly represented in the controversy between the school board
and teachers' union."6 The public school students of Pennsylvania
have a constitutional right to a "thorough and efficient system of
public education." ' Judge Kramer criticized the court for not con-
sidering the impact of lost holiday and summer vacation days on
students either holding jobs during these periods or needing grades
from completed courses before applying to colleges or planning to
attend summer school in order to qualify for college admission. 8
The school children appeared to be "pawns in an adult game of
economics."59 Thus, Judge Kramer concluded that if the school
district, teachers' union, Attorney General, Secretary of Education,
and state legislature would not recognize the problems of Pennsyl-
vania's public school children and protect their constitutional
rights, then the courts must be willing to do so.60
The commonwealth court also considered whether a teachers'
strike was properly enjoined by the trial court in Bristol Township
Education Association v. School District of Bristol Township.61
There, the strike had lasted for twenty-six instructional days and
only twenty-three possible make-up days were available.6 2 In addi-
tion, the labor dispute caused the normal disruptions incident to a
strike: students were denied educational programs, working
mothers were inconvenienced by children at home during the
weekday, high school seniors were inadequately prepared for col-
lege entrance exams, there was a lack of special education pro-
grams for handicapped students, and various community-wide pro-
grams were cancelled.63
The Bristol court recognized that state subsidies to the school
district could be lost because an inadequate number of days were
56. Id. at 219-20, 304 A.2d at 926.
57. Id. (quoting Pa. CONST. art. III, § 14).
58. Bellefonte, 9 Pa. Commw. at 220, 304 A.2d at 926.
59. Id. "If the teachers and the school district agree to use all legal holidays, all week-
ends and all vacation time to make up for the lost days of a strike, does that mean the
students will have no rest? Do they have any rights?" Id.
60. Id.
61. 14 Pa. Commw. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974). The court's decision was written by
Judge Blatt. Id. at 466-72, 322 A.2d at 768-71. Judge Mencer, joined by Judge Kramer,
submitted a dissenting opinion. Id. at 472-78, 322 A.2d at 771-74. Judge Kramer also filed a
separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 478, 322 A.2d at 774.
62. Id. at 468, 322 A.2d at 769.
63. Id. at 468-69, 322 A.2d at 769-70. The trial court judges made a total of 17 findings
that supported the granting of an injunction. Id.
1989
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available to replace the school days already forfeited by the
strike. While cautioning that the legislature did not intend to
limit the maximum number of strike days, and the loss of state
subsidies alone would not warrant issuing an injunction, the com-
monwealth court found that the lower court did not err in granting
an injunction. 6 The court went on to further warn that it could
not hold that the lower court's other findings,"6 either taken alone
or collectively, would necessarily amount to a clear and present
danger or threat.6 " However, the opinion stated that it was not
necessarily unreasonable for the lower court to find an injunction
appropriate in the face of twenty-six lost school days and the ac-
cumulation of the inconveniences common to a strike.68 Thus, the
injunction issued by the lower court was affirmed. 9
Judge Mencer filed a dissenting opinion in Bristol,70 arguing that
the majority's decision essentially equated the inability of a school
district to satisfy the 180 day requirement with a clear and present
danger or threat to the public.7 1 The dissent quoted the language
of the Armstrong decision, which stated that a danger or threat
justifying an injunction must be one that the legislature would not
have considered normally incident to a strike. In an attempt to
minimize the impact of the 180 day requirement, Judge Mencer
noted that a school district possesses a statutory alternative to in-
stead provide 990 hours of instruction per school year. 3 By adding
64. Id. at 469-70, 322 A.2d at 770. See supra notes 25, 33.
65. Bristol, 14 Pa. Commw. at 469-70, 322 A.2d at 770. "The Chancellor ...deter-
mined that the threatened loss of the subsidies would constitute a danger which required
that the strike be enjoined. We cannot hold that he erred in so finding." Id.
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
67. Bristol, 14 Pa. Commw. at 470, 322 A.2d at 770 (emphasis in original).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 470, 322 A.2d at 771.
70. Id. at 472, 322 A.2d at 771. Judge Mencer's dissent was joined by Judge Kramer.
Id. at 478, 322 A.2d at 774.
71. Id. at 472, 322 A.2d at 771. Judge Mencer claimed that the concept that a threat to
the 180 requirement equaled a clear and present danger to the public originated from the
case of Root v. Northern Cambria School Dist., 10 Pa. Commw. 174, 309 A.2d 175 (1973).
Bristol, 14 Pa. Commw. at 472, 322 A.2d at 771. In Root, the commonwealth court consid-
ered whether the dictum of Armstrong required "that the danger that the district will lose
state subsidy by the failure to teach 180 days, if clear and present, would be proper grounds
for enjoining a strike .. " Root, 10 Pa. Commw. at 180, 309 A.2d at 178.
72. Bristol, 14 Pa. Commw. at 474-75, 322 A.2d at 772-73 (quoting Armstrong Educ.
Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 382-86, 291 A.2d 120, 123-25 (1972)).
73. Bristol, 14 Pa. Commw. at 473, 322 A.2d at 772. The School Code provides that a
school district may request the Secretary of Education to approve "a school year containing
a minimum of nine hundred ninety hours of instruction at the secondary level or nine hun-
dred (900) hours of instruction at the elementary level as the equivalent of one hundred
Vol. 27:583
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one-half hour to the normal school day, a district may satisfy its
state subsidy requirements in 165 days, and an additional one hour
of classroom instruction would meet the requirements in 153
school days."' Using this alternative, Judge Mencer contended that
the teachers' statutory right to strike and the school district's stat-
utory duty to provide 180 days, or 990 hours, of instruction could
be better harmonized; but, in any event, the dissent concluded that
the loss of state subsidies from offering less than 180 days of in-
struction did not create a clear and present danger or threat to the
public and could not justify issuing an injunction.75
Based upon the various decisions of the commonwealth court,7
the judges of the court of common pleas have attempted to develop
a workable analysis for determining when a teachers strike
presents a "clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety
or welfare of the public."'77 A classic opinion addressing this issue
was delivered by Judge Narick of the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County in the case of Bethel Park School District v.
Bethel Park Federation of Teacherss.7  There, the teachers union
went on strike at the beginning of the 1986-87 school year, and on
October 6, 1986, the school board sought an injunction ordering
the teachers back to work.7 9 The school district presented evidence
that unless instruction commenced by October 20, the district
would be unable to satisfy the 180 day requirement and state sub-
sidies would be lost.80 The school board also claimed that educa-
eighty (180) school days." 24 P.S. § 15-1504 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1988).
74. Bristol, 14 Pa. Commw. at 474, 322 A.2d at 772.
75. Id. at 477-78, 322 A.2d at 774.
76. See Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 291
A.2d 120 (1972); Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers v. Ross, 8 Pa. Commw. 204, 301 A.2d 405
(1973); Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Bellefonte Area School Dist., 9 Pa.
Commw. 210, 304 A.2d 922 (1973); Root v. Northern Cambria School Dist., 10 Pa. Commw.
174, 309 A.2d 175 (1973); Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township,
14 Pa. Commw. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974); and Scanlon v. Mount Union Area Bd. of School
Directors, 51 Pa. Commw. 83, 415 A.2d 96 (1980), afi'd, 499 Pa. 215, 452 A.2d 1016 (1982).
77. 43 P.S. § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
78. 135 Pgh. L.J. 127 (C.P. Alleg. Co. 1986). The Bethel Park school district had suf-
fered through its first teachers strike in the Fall of 1979. The union members were ordered
back to work under an injunction issued October 17, 1979 and the teachers worked for the
entire 1979-80 school year without a contract. Bethel Park School District v. Bethel Park
Federation of Teachers, 414 A.2d 145, 146 (1980). A new collective bargaining agreement
was eventually reached during the summer of 1980.
79. Bethel Park, 135 Pgh. L.J. at 128. The school district requested an injunction
based upon not only the "clear and present danger" standard of Act 195, 43 P.S. § 1101.1003
(Purdon Supp. 1988), but also the 180 day requirement under the School Code, 24 P.S. § 15-
1501 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1988).
80. Bethel Park, 135 Pgh. L.J. at 129. The school district began offering on September
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tional programs would be adversely affected by the strike's contin-
uation and the district was incurring additional expenses in the
custodial, food service, security, and transportation areas.81
Initially, in reviewing case law from the commonwealth court,
Judge Narick noted that the potential loss of state subsidies, for
failure to satisfy the 180 day requirement, was not in itself a suffi-
cient justification for enjoining a teachers strike."2 The Bethel
Park opinion also found that to satisfy the "danger or threat to the
public" requirement of Act 195, the school board must prove
harmful circumstances which would not normally arise out of a
strike by school teachers.83 Judge Narick labeled the disruption of
administrative procedures, postponement of extracurricular activi-
ties, and extension of the school year further into June as "incon-
veniences" to the public.8 4 These problems, however, are inherent
in the very nature of a school strike, and the common pleas court
concluded that to grant an injunction because of these inconve-
niences would essentially nullify the teachers' statutory right to
strike8 5
The issue in the Bethel Park case, as phrased by Judge Narick,
was whether the right of public school teachers to strike under Act
195 "may only continue for a specific number of days, whether it
be 26, 30 or 32 days, if no agreement is reached and then the in-
junction would automatically be issued. . ". .",6 The court cited
cases which held that a school district may provide less than 180
days of instruction when strike activities make rescheduling of all
10 four and one-half hours of instruction per day to the district's 510 high school seniors. Id.
at 128.
81. Id. at 129. The court noted that, in contrast to the 1979 strike, sports programs
and related extracurricular activities were continuing and various testing programs, includ-
ing PSAT, ACT, and SAT, would be administered as planned. Id. The court also heard
evidence that the earliest college application deadlines were in November and many univer-
sities set no cut off date for application. Id.
82. Id. at 130-31 (citing Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Town-
ship, 14 Pa. Commw. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974)).
83. Bethel Park, 135 Pgh. L.J. at 132.
84. Id. The Bethel Park court quoted the following language from the commonwealth
court:
However difficult it may be to envision a strike of public employes which would not
constitute a threat to the public welfare, this court has nonetheless unanimously held
that the Act did not intend that courts should enjoin strikes by public employes be-
cause they produce effects normally incident to a strike.
Id. (quoting Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Bellefonte Area School Dist.,
9 Pa. Commw. 210, 213 n.1, 304 A.2d 922, 923 n.1 (1973)).




the days lost impossible.87 Judge Narick determined that under the
current statutory laws impacting on a teachers' strike, it was im-
possible for the court to reconcile the right to strike under Act
195,88 the school district's duty to provide 180 days of instruction
under the School Code,89 and the students right to a thorough and
efficient system of public education under the state constitution. 0
In addition, the common pleas court recognized that the judiciary
is in no position to effectively reconcile the statutory provisions,
and that this task may only be accomplished by the legislature
through a complete reexamination of the entire area of the law."1
In summary, Judge Narick concluded that a clear and present
danger or threat to the public is not created when a teachers'
strike prevents a school district from providing 180 days of instruc-
tion and the district consequently faces the potential loss of state
subsidies.92 Any other holding would require that a teachers' strike
which infringed on the 180 day requirement be presumed invalid
and subject to an immediate injunction. The court also reasoned
that a contrary ruling would mean that "the school board is as-
sured that its position in negotiations at the bargaining table,
whether fair or unfair, will prevail if only it can hold out long
enough to encroach in the 180-day requirement." ' Judge Narick
would only grant an injunction if the evils of the strike were ex-
tremely serious and the level of immediate danger extremely
high.8 Finding none of these circumstances present, Judge Narick
87. Id. at 133 (citing Scanlon v. Mount Union Area Bd. of School Directors, 51 Pa.
Commw. 83, 415 A.2d 96 (1980), aff'd, 499 Pa. 215, 452 A.2d 1016 (1982), and Root v. North-
ern Cambria School Dist., 10 Pa. Commw. 174, 309 A.2d 175 (1973)).
88. 43 P.S. § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
89. 24 P.S. § 15-1501 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1988).
90. Bethel Park, 135 Pgh. L.J. at 133. The students' constitutional right to a public
education is outlined in Article III, § 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
91. Bethel Park, 135 Pgh. L.J. at 133.
92. Id. Judge Narick stated:
I do not believe that where a teachers' strike prevents a school district from having
180 days of instruction in the school year with a consequence of possible loss of state
subsidy, there is thereby a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety, or
welfare of the public.
Id.
93. Id. The court reasoned that if a threat to the 180 day rule equaled a danger to the
public's welfare, "then it would follow that any strike which infringes upon the 180-day
requirement is infected with almost presumptive invalidity." Id.
94. Id. at 133-34. The court also found that combining the inconveniences inherent in
a labor dispute with the encroachment on the 180 day requirement would still not justify
enjoining a teachers' strike. Id. at 134.
95. Id. In Judge Narick's view:
[T]he evil, which is not the strike itself, which is permitted, nor the natural disrup-
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held on October 17, 1986, that the Bethel Park teachers' strike did
not present a clear and present danger or threat to the health,
safety or welfare of the public, and therefore, the school district's
request for an injunction was denied."6
Act 195 was first passed in 1970, but the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did not attempt to interpret the "clear and present danger
or threat" to the public language until the 1988 case of Jersey
Shore Area School District v. Jersey Shore Education Associa-
tion.9 7 The issue before the court was whether the trial court was
justified 8 in granting an injunction ordering the striking teachers
back to work when the strike's continuation would prevent the dis-
trict from providing 180 days of instruction and the community
had suffered from the common problems incident to a teachers'
strike.99 Considering these circumstance, the supreme court at-
tions flowing therefrom, but [the evil] must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminent danger extremely high before the court can utilize the extraordinary rem-
edy of injunctive relief to terminate a strike specifically authorized by statute.
Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. After Judge Narick denied the request for an injunction on Friday, October 17,
the Bethel Park school board and the Bethel Park Federation of Teachers returned to the
bargaining table. A new labor agreement was tentatively reached on Sunday, October 19 and
the teachers returned to work on Monday, October 20, 1986. Because the high school seniors
had attended classes during the strike, they graduated on time in early June of 1987. The
school district canceled scheduled holidays, but all other grades were still required to attend
school until June 30, 1987. The school district fell six days short of the 180 day requirement,
the teachers were paid for six less days of work, and the following year the school district
received a proportionate reduction in its state subsidies. Telephone Interview with Dr. Peter
H. Zonca, Assistant Superintendent of the Bethel Park School District (March 9, 1989).
97. 548 A.2d 1202 (1988). The majority opinion was written by Justice Stout, who was
joined by Chief Justice Nix and Justices Flaherty and McDermott. Id. at 1203-08. A dissent-
ing opinion was filed by Justice Larsen, who was joined by Justice Papadakos. Id. at 1208-
10. A dissent was also submitted by Justice Zappala. Id. at 1210-11.
98. The supreme court's standard of review is a narrow one. Id. at 1204. A chancellor's
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless there exists "an abuse of discretion or a capri-
cious disbelief of the evidence or a lack of evidentiary support on the record for such find-
ings." Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 127, 224 A.2d 164, 168 (1966)). In addi-
tion, the supreme court will not reverse an injunction order, except when "the rules of law
relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable." Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1204 (quot-
ing Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 385 Pa. 342, 343-44, 123 A.2d 626, 627 (1956)).
99. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1203-04. The Jersey Shore teachers' union went on
strike on September 10, 1984, and were ordered back to work on October 11, under an in-
junction issued by the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas. Id. at 1204. The common-
wealth court affirmed the injunction on the ground that the strike threatened the school
district's ability to provide 180 days of education to its students. Jersey Shore Educ. Ass'n v.
Jersey Shore Area School Dist., 99 Pa. Commw. 163, 512 A.2d 805 (1986). The supreme
court disagreed with the commonwealth court's decision to affirm the injunction "solely" on
the basis that the 180 day requirement was in jeopardy, but the supreme court nonetheless
affirmed the injunction on the record as a whole. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1204 (emphasis
in original).
Teachers' Strike
tempted to reconcile the conflicting limitations placed on a school
strike by the provisions of Act 195 and the School Code's 180 day
requirement.100
Justice Stout began her opinion by reviewing the pertinent facts
in the case. 01 After only four days of classes at the beginning of
the 1984-85 school year, the Jersey Shore teachers went on
strike. 102 On October 8, 1984, the school district sought an injunc-
tion ordering the teachers back to work. 03 The Jersey Shore super-
intendent testified that October 15 was the last day that the school
district could reasonably provide 180 days of education.10 4 The su-
perintendent also presented evidence that the school district would
lose $26,637 per day in state subsidies for every day the school dis-
trict fell short of the 180 day requirement.1 0 5 The school district
contended that high school seniors' SAT preparations, scholarship
applications, and guidance counseling services were all adversely
affected by the strike.' Finally, the school board claimed that loss
of learning capacity was resulting from the students extended stay
away from the classroom.10 7 After the testimony was completed,
the common pleas court elected to issue an injunction on the
ground that all of the evidence had established a clear and present
danger to the public. 08
After reviewing past case law, 09 the supreme court held that the
loss of state subsidies from the failure to satisfy the 180 day rule,
alone, does not create a clear and present danger or threat to the
100. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1203.
101. Id. at 1204.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1204-05. The superintendent allowed for six snow days in the schedule, as
well as two non-mandatory holidays. Id.
105. Id. at 1205. The superintendent also claimed that the strike had already cost the
school district $65,944. Id. The union responded with expert testimony that the school dis-
trict would actually have a net savings of $24,199, even with the potential of lost subsidies.
I.
106. Id. The district contended that other grades would also be at a disadvantage
when taking state mandated remedial testing programs and a greater strain would be placed
on remedial courses because marginal students had already missed so much school. Id.
107. Id. The superintendent presented test scores taken after a previous strike which
showed a decrease in student aptitude. Id. The teachers' union called an expert witness who
disputed the superintendent's interpretation of the prior test scores. Id.
108. Id. The commonwealth court affirmed the injunction order, solely on the basis
that the strike threatened the school district's ability to provide 180 days of education. Id.
at 1204 (emphasis in original) (citing Jersey Shore Educ. Ass'n v. Jersey Shore Area School
Dist., 99 Pa. Commw. 163, 512 A.2d 805 (1986)).
109. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1206-07.
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public's welfare, safety or health. 10 Justice Stout cautioned that
"the length of the instructional calendar and the loss of state fund-
ing" represented only one factor the trial court should consider in
determining whether a clear and present danger or threat existed
to justify issuing an injunction."' Based upon the facts present in
the Jersey Shore strike, the court reasoned that these factors, in
conjunction, created actual, impending and ever increasing harm
to the school district's students." 2 Consequently, "the health and
welfare of the students, who cannot and must not be treated as a
category separate from the public at large, was clearly endangered
and threatened.""' s Therefore, the supreme court majority opinion
affirmed the commonwealth court's decision to uphold the injunc-
tion ordering the Jersey Shore teachers' union back to work." 4
Justice Larsen filed a dissenting opinion " 5 where he noted that
the state legislature gave public school teachers "the right to
strike," while fully cognizant that the School Code required 180
days of student instruction." 6 The legislature only made allowance
for the court's to issue an injunction when a "clear and present
danger or threat" to the public existed." 7 Justice Larsen argued
that this standard for granting an injunction under Act 195 re-
quired far more "than the myriad inevitable and expected inconve-
niences and disruptions" inherent in any teachers' strike, including
an encroachment on the 180 day rule "of which the legislature was
well aware.""18 In support of his position that the facts present in
the Jersey Shore teachers' strike did not warrant the issuance of an
injunction, Justice Larsen quoted extensively from the Bethel
Park case where Judge Narick deemed many of the same strike
related problems inadequate to justify an injunction." 9
110. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added). Justice Stout noted that: "We resist the facile
temptation to legislate judicially a 180-day limit to the teachers' right to strike. We leave it
to the legislature . . . to decide whether such a limit should be imposed." Id. at 1207 n.9.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1207-08 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 1208.
114. Id. "In this case the school district demonstrated beyond peradventure the exis-
tence of a 'clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public.'"
Id. at 1207.
115. Id. at 1208-10. Justice Larsen's dissent was joined by Justice Papadakos. Id. at
1210.
116. Id. at 1208 (emphasis in original).
117. Id. (emphasis in original).
118. Id. (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 1208-09 (quoting Bethel Park School Dist. v. Bethel Park Fed'n of Teach-




Justice Larsen reiterated in his Jersey Shore dissent that the
legislature did not intend the inherent disruptions and normal in-
conveniences associated with a teachers' strike, as were present in
the Jersey Shore and Bethel Park strikes, to authorize the court's
use of the "extraordinary remedy" of injunctive relief.120 The dis-
sent charged that Justice Stout's majority opinion seriously under-
mined the public school teachers' right to strike and turned "the
ordinary into the extraordinary."' 2' Justice Larsen also expressed
concern that the majority's decision will allow school boards to un-
fairly wait out a strike until the 180 day deadline approaches and
then go into court, present the standard list of inconveniences as-
sociated with a teachers' strike, and obtain an injunction.1 2 2 In
conclusion, Justice Larsen warned that the gains public school
teachers had made, because of collective bargaining and the right
to strike, might prove fleeting under the majority opinion, and
therefore, he urged the legislature to take steps to protect the ad-
vances won by public school teachers since Act 195 was passed in
1970.123
Justice Zappala also submitted a dissenting opinion in the
Jersey Shore case. 12' Justice Zappala agreed with Justice Stout's
holding that the risk of losing state subsidies for failure to satisfy
the 180 day requirement was not a clear and present danger or
threat to the public's welfare.' 2 5 The dissent, however, contended
that the majority's emphasis on the common inconveniences faced
by students during a teachers' strike had, in effect, created a per se
rule that a school district's inability to provide 180 days of instruc-
tion represented a clear and present danger or threat to the pub-
120. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1209-10. Justice Larsen elaborated that:
These types of harms usually associated with a public school teachers' strike were not
unknown or unimaginable when the legislature prohibited courts from interfering
with such strikes unless or until a clear and present danger or threat to the public
health, safety or welfare were presented, and the legislature could not have equated
the former harm with the latter clear and present danger or threat.
Id.
121. Id. at 1210.
122. Id. Justice Larsen credits Judge Narick for the observation that the school dis-
trict gains an unfair bargaining advantage when the courts equate the clear and present
danger standard with an encroachment on the 180 day requirement. Id. See Bethel Park,
135 Pgh. L.J. at 133-34.
123. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1210. Justice Larsen strongly urged "the legislature to
take prompt action to preserve the hard fought gains of this Commonwealth's front line
soldiers in the war against ignorance and anarchy." Id.
124. Id. at 1210-11.
125. Id. at 1210.
1989
Duquesne Law Review
lic.' " Justice Zappala reasoned that because the inconveniences to
students automatically develop whenever a teachers' strike com-
mences, once the school district can also establish the potential for
lost state subsidies from an inability to satisfy the 180 day rule,
under the majority opinion a common pleas court will have little
choice but to enjoin the strike.
1 27
Justice Zappala's dissent in Jersey Shore also took issue with
Justice Stout's attempt in the majority opinion to equate a danger
or threat to the student population with a danger or threat to the
general public.2 8 The dissent interpreted the legislature's passage
of Act 195 as a conscious decision to favor a public teacher's right
to strike over other competing interests, including those of the
public school children. 2 " Justice Zappala claimed that the unique
problems faced by the student population were not synonymous
with the definition of public welfare contemplated by the legisla-
ture.130 Thus, contrary to legislative intent, the majority opinion
"places student inconveniences in a preeminent position and rele-
gates the teachers' right to strike to a secondary concern.' 31 In
further support of his position, Justice Zappala cited numerous
commonwealth court cases 132 which considered the inconveniences
experienced by school students, and noted that the legislature had
never attempted to amend Act 195 in a manner which would cir-
cumscribe the clear meaning of the word "public.' 33 Therefore,
the dissent in Jersey Shore concluded that the judiciary should
not disrupt the balance created by the legislature when it passed
Act 195.1"
126. Id. Justice Zappala found that "while the majority professes to resist any tempta-
tion to judicially legislate a 180-day limitation to the right to strike, it has in fact suc-
cumbed to that temptation." Id.
127. Id. Justice Zappala also concluded that "[a] teachers' strike which lasts long
enough to create that economic threat [of lost state subsidies] will always give rise as well to
the student inconveniences which concern the majority." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The dissent recognized that "[tihe student population was directly affected by
[Act 195]. But it was the clear mandate of the legislature that a strike by public employees
'shall not be prohibited unless or until the strike creates a clear and present danger or
threat to the . . . public.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 43 P.S. § 1101.1003 (Purdon
Supp. 1988)).
130. Id. at 1210-11.
131. Id. at 1211.
132. Id. See supra note 76.
133. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1211 (emphasis in original).
134. Id. Justice Zappala cautioned that "[a]lthough the Legislature's inattention to
student inconveniences may be perceived by some as a failure, the remedy properly rests




How the "clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety
and welfare" language of Act 195 will be interpreted in the future
by the courts, interested parties, and the state legislature may not
be known exactly, but certain assumptions and predictions seem in
order subsequent to the supreme court's Jersey Shore decision. If
nothing else, Justice Stout's majority opinion clarifies that a school
district's loss of state subsidies for failure to satisfy the 180 day
requirement, alone, does not justify a court ordered injunction to
end a teachers' strike.135 Beyond this holding, the Jersey Shore
case merely affirmed that the facts present in the Jersey Shore
strike, particularly the adverse affects upon the student popula-
tion, were more than adequate for the trial court to find a clear
and present danger to the public's welfare and grant an
injunction. 1 6
The procedural setting in which the supreme court reviewed the
Jersey Shore case must also be considered. The standard of review
in equity cases, including injunctions, is very narrow. 3 7 A trial
court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless there exists ei-
ther an abuse of discretion, a total disbelief of the evidence, or a
lack of evidence to support the findings of fact.3 8 The supreme
court gives stricter scrutiny to conclusions of law,'3 " but a trial
court's injunction will not be reversed unless "the rules of law re-
lied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable. '" 0 Therefore,
the findings of the trial court, that the Jersey Shore school dis-
trict's students were suffering harms that presented a clear and
present danger to the public, were subject to only a very limited
review by the supreme court.
In light of the supreme court's analysis in the Jersey Shore deci-
sion, and its procedural setting, a common pleas court judge enter-
taining a school district's injunction request in the future should
135. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 1207-08.
137. Id. at 1204 (citing Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 (1975)).
138. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1204 (citing Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 127, 224
A.2d 164, 168 (1966)).
139. Id.
140. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1204 (quoting Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 385 Pa.
342, 343-44, 123 A.2d 626, 627 (1966)). The standard of review by the commonwealth court
in Act 195 injunction cases is subject to the same restrictions. See Bristol Township Educ.
Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 14 Pa. Commw. 463, 322 A.2d 767, 768 (1974);
Bethel Park School Dist. v. Bethel Park Federation of Teachers, 420 A.2d at 19; and Arm-
strong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 291 A.2d 120, 123 (1972).
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continue to exercise independent judgment. The trial judge cannot
issue an injunction solely because the school district will otherwise
lose state subsidies,"" but the judge should still exercise discretion
concerning whether the other problems associated with the strike
are creating a clear and present danger or threat to the public.
Otherwise, the concerns of the dissenting justices in Jersey
Shore42 will be realized as the judiciary will have effectively
usurped the legislature and created a per se rule entitling a school
district to an automatic injunction whenever a teachers' strike en-
croaches on the 180-day rule.
In determining the necessity of an injunction, the common pleas
court judge should also consider whether the school district
avoided serious negotiations with the union and instead waited for
the 180 day deadline to approach.' 43 If evidence exists that the
school board was so motivated, the trial judge must deny the in-
junction request or run the risk of presiding over the destruction of
the public school teachers' statutory right to bargain collectively
and strike against their public employers. "
The impact of the Jersey Shore decision on the "clear and pre-
sent danger to the public" standard should also be seriously evalu-
ated by the teachers' unions in Pennsylvania. 45 The unions may
take heart in the supreme court's holding that the 180 day require-
ment does not, in and of itself, justify the issuing of an injunction.
However, the teachers' union must be concerned with Justice
Stout's implication that the standard inconveniences suffered by
the district's school children during a strike, combined with lost
state subsidies, justify ordering striking teachers back to work. The
unions should therefore consider implementing steps during future
strikes to minimize the labor dispute's adverse impact upon the
students.'" Specifically, striking teachers should: allow high school
141. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1207.
142. See supra notes 115-134 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissenting
opinions filed by Justices Larsen and Zappala in Jersey Shore.
143. See Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1208-10 (Larsen, J. dissenting) and Bethel Park,
135 Pgh. L.J. at 133-34.
144. Id. While no evidence was presented in the Bethel Park case that the school
board was avoiding serious negotiations while waiting for the 180 day deadline to arrive,
once the injunction was denied by Judge Narick on October 17, 1986, the school district and
teachers' union reached a tentative agreement a mere two days later. See supra note 97.
145. All teachers' union locals in Pennsylvania are affiliated with either the Pennsylva-
nia State Education Association (PSEA) or the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).
146. See Bethel Park, 135 Pgh. L.J. at 134, where the strategy of reducing the strike's
impact on the students was met with apparent success when Judge Narick denied the school
district's petition for an injunction. Id. In contrast to the 1979 strike, where the union took
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seniors to attend classes; authorize guidance counselors to consult
on college admissions; hold SAT preparatory classes; provide spe-
cial education instructors; and encourage the continuation of extra-
curricular activities and sports. In addition, if the teachers' union
has evidence that the school board, in reliance on Jersey Shore, is
merely waiting for the 180 day deadline to arrive, the union should
file unfair labor practice charges against the school district for its
failure to negotiate in good faith.147
The school districts of Pennsylvania also should reevaluate, in
light of the Jersey Shore opinion, what "danger or threat to the
public" must be demonstrated by the public employer in order to
obtain an injunction order. School board members have a duty to
negotiate in good faith and not merely wait until the passage of
time aggravates the strike situation and increases the potential for
judicial intervention. After the strike commences, documentation
by the school district of the resulting problems, especially the inju-
ries relating to the students, would be very advantageous if the dis-
trict goes to court. In addition, the superintendent should continu-
ally revise the school year calendar and track not only when the
180 day requirement can no longer be satisfied by the district, but
also how much state funding would be sacrificed on a per day
basis.
The more interesting question, from a school board's perspec-
tive, is whether the district should implement any available contin-
gency plans for continuing such programs as classes for high school
seniors, preparatory seminars on the SAT's, and extracurricular ac-
tivities and sports. Based upon Justice Stout's emphasis in Jersey
Shore on the injuries suffered by students exposed to a teachers'
strike,"" if the school district offers alternative programs, the dis-
trict decreases harm to the students, but also potentially reduces
the chances of later obtaining an injunction. On the other hand, if
the district takes no steps to continue a minimum level of educa-
tional and extracurricular programs, the school board may increase
their ability to later petition for an injunction order. The school
a hard line throughout the dispute and an injunction order was issued, during the 1986
strike high school seniors attended classes, extracurricular activities and fall sports pro-
grams continued, and arrangements were made to administer various testing programs. Id.
at 128-29.
147. See 43 P.S. § 1101.1201(5) (Purdon Supp. 1988). Section 1201(5) prohibits a pub-
lic employer from refusing to bargain in good faith with the employees' exclusive bargaining
representative. Id.
148. Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1207-08.
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district obviously has a duty to its school children to provide the
best education available under the circumstances; however, a
school board involved in a bitter labor dispute might consider of-
fering little in the way of alternative forms of education, claim that
the students were suffering severe injury as a result of the strike,
and request that a common pleas court order the teachers back to
work.
All interested parties evaluating the future impact of the Jersey
Shore decision on the Act 195 injunction standard must also con-
sider the precarious coalition of justices forming the majority opin-
ion. The seven member Pennsylvania Supreme Court produced
only a four-justice majority in the Jersey Shore case.1 9 Justice
Stout, the author of the majority opinion, reaches the mandatory
retirement age of 70 in March of 1989 and will step down from her
seat on the court. Thus, only three justices on the supreme court
remain in favor of the Jersey Shore decision and this plurality
cannot expect to pick up any support from the other three justices
who filed adamant dissenting opinions. 5 ' A new justice will be
elected to the supreme court in November of 1989 and assume of-
fice in January of 1990. This new member of the court will re-
present the swing vote on any judicial interpretation of Act 195's
"clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare
of the public" injunction standard, and until the supreme court
reconsiders this language the precedential value of Jersey Shore
may remain in doubt.
Although the supreme court waited eighteen years before first
attempting to interpret the injunction language under Act 195, and
the exact impact of the court's Jersey Shore decision remains un-
clear, a definitive understanding of section 1003'1 would emerge if
the legislature attempted to either amend or clarify the public
school teachers' statutory right to strike. When Act 195 was passed
by the Pennsylvania legislature, the lawmakers were precise in de-
fining the right to strike, but only provided the vague "clear and
present danger or threat to the public" language as guidance for
when the courts should issue an injunction restricting the teachers'
149. Id. at 1203. The Jersey Shore majority consisted of Chief Justice Nix and Jus-
tices Flaherty, McDermott, and Stout.
150. Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Papadakos, wrote a dissenting opinion in Jersey
Shore. Id. at 1208-10. Justice Zappala also submitted a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1210-11.
151. 43 P.S. § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1988). Section 1003 encompasses the "clear




ability to strike.152 Even with the uncertain language of section
1003 and the courts' obvious difficulty in formulating a pragmatic
standard of analysis, the legislature has not seriously considered
amending or clarifying the injunction language of Act 195 since its
inception in 1970.
Several theories may be presented to explain why the legislature
has not amended Act 195, in spite of its apparent shortcomings.
For instance, the members of the state legislature may have been
satisfied with the court of common pleas' and commonwealth
court's prior interpretations of Act 195 and considered these deci-
sions consistent with legislative intent.' s3 A second explanation for
legislative inactivity might be that while the legislature was not
completely content with the current state of affairs, the elected
representatives -were unable to develop any practical alternatives
without seriously infringing on the public employees' right to col-
lective bargaining. Finally, one could contend that the legislature
desired to at least consider substantive revisions to section 1003,
but lacked the will to proceed. This last theory seems especially
meritorious since maintenance of the status quo, at least prior to
Jersey Shore, favovered the teachers, and their unions, the PSEA
and PFT,5'5 had the political muscle to fight off any challenges to
their right to collectively bargain and strike.155
152. See Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v. Bellefonte Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw.
210, 304 A.2d 922, 923 (1973).
When Legislatures finally determine to adopt a wholly new concept of public manage-
ment, they usually do so in terms more expressive of their fear of the unforeseeable
harm which may result from the new policy than of their confidence in the good it
will accomplish. Hence, such legislation is often tentative, imprecise, elliptical and
incomplete, leaving the hard choices either to the improbable chance that they 'may
not come up', or to the courts. [Act 195] is an example of such legislation.
Id.
153. The argument that the legislature's decision not to amend § 1003 indicates satis-
faction with prior judicial interpretations of Act 195 was presented in Jersey Shore by Jus-
tice Zappala. See Jersey Shore, 548 A.2d at 1211 (Zappala, J. dissenting).
154. The teachers' union locals in Pennsylvania are affiliated with either the Pennsyl-
vania State Education Association (PSEA) or the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers
(PFTr).
155. As of February, 1989, the PSEA had 105,896 members state-wide, and operated
approximately 600 collective bargaining units for teachers and support staff throughout
Pennsylvania. Each PSEA member pays $196 a year in dues, giving the PSEA and annual
operating budget of over $20 million. Telephone Interview with David E. Helfman, PSEA
Director of Compensation (March 10, 1989). The PFT has around fifty bargaining locals for
teachers and support staff in Pennsylvania, including the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh
school districts, representing approximately 35,000 teachers. Each professional member pays
a total of $325 per year in dues, with $69 going to the state organization. Thus, the PFT has
an annual budget in excess of $2.4 million. Telephone Interview with Ed White, Staff Rep-
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A reasonable presumption may be made that the legislature did
not amend Act 195 prior to Jersey Shore at least partially because
the teachers' unions were satisfied with the commonwealth court's
interpretation of section 1003. Thus, the question becomes whether
the unions will now encourage the legislature to amend the "clear
and present danger" language in response to the Jersey Shore de-
cision. If, as the dissenters feared, the majority opinion is inter-
preted as creating a per se rule that an injunction must be ordered
when a strike infringes on the 180 day requirement, the legislature
may be motivated to take action. The elected state representatives
might find this restrictive interpretation of Act 195 contrary to the
intentions of section 1003. In addition, the PSEA and PFT would
certainly consider such an interpretation contrary to their interests
and institute lobbying efforts to encourage the legislature to clarify
and strengthen the teachers' rights. The unions, however, may find
the task of altering the law, as interpreted in Jersey Shore, more
difficult than their earlier objective of maintaining the status quo
under the commonwealth court's interpretation of section 1003.
If the common pleas courts continue to exercise independent
judgment after the Jersey Shore decision, as the judges did under
the commonwealth court decisions, and do not adhere to a per se
180 day rule when considering whether to issue an injunction or-
der, the legislature is not likely to amend section 1003 of Act 195.
Members of the legislature, however, should consider another al-
ternative which does not impinge upon the public teachers' right to
strike, but instead discourages strikes by financially rewarding
school districts and unions that reach agreement without a strike.
Act 195 could be amended to provide that any school district
which enters into an 'early bird' contract,6 6 before June 1 of the
year in which the old labor contract expires, would receive addi-
tional state subsidies for either the upcoming year or the life of the
contract.
Under an 'early bird' statute, both the school district and the
teachers' union would be motivated to settle their differences early,
in order to obtain the additional state funds, and would be less
likely to subject the community and its children to a strike. The
additional funding would allow the school district to pay competi-
resentative, PFT-Pittsburgh office (March 15, 1989).
156. An 'early bird' contract is a labor agreement between the employer and union
which is executed a substantial period of time before the current agreement expires. Inter-
view, Patrick J. Basial, Professor of Labor Law, Duquesne University Law School (March
15, 1989).
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tive wages, attract quality personnel, and provide important educa-
tional programs, without raising local property taxes. The teachers
would achieve a better standard of living for themselves while
avoiding the need for a strike. Thus, while the legislature may
avoid amending Act 195's "clear and present danger or threat to
the health, safety or welfare of the public" language, the state's law
makers should attempt to reduce the potential that a teachers'
strike will create a danger or threat to the public's welfare by pass-
ing an 'early bird' amendment to Act 195.
David T. Fisfis

